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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Using a simple overlapping generations framework, we analyze the relationship between tax eva-
sion, determined endogenously, and different policy instruments. More precisely, the analysis tries
to provide microeconomic foundation to the process of tax evasion, and in turn, reflect on the be-
havior of the same in response to alternative policy decisions of the consolidated government. The
motivation for this study is simply, to understand better the process of tax evasion decision taken
by agents in the economy, and which policies can be utilized best to tackle the problem.
Surprisingly, even though the importance of tax evasion has been widely realized, not much
attempt has been made to endogenize the process and analyze the effects of alternative policies on
the same. Studies have tended to concentrate on alternative instruments of government finance in
an environment where tax evasion is prevalent, with the consolidated government aiming to max-
imize growth or utility (See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Holman and Neanidis (2003) and
Gupta (2005).). But in all these analyses, tax evasion has been treated as an exogenous fraction of
taxable income which does not get reported. Our study, in this regard, to the best of our knowledge,
is the first of its kind.
Due to the non-linearity of the system, there are no closed-form solutions and, hence, the model
needs to be numerically evaluated. The model is calibrated to four southern European economies,
namely, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It must, however, be noted that our model economy
is a general one and can be applied to any economy subjected to tax evasion. Our restriction of
the applicability to other economies, was plainly due to the unavailability of data regarding the
sizes of the underground economy, hence tax evasion, and production parameters. Moreover, the
chosen economies, have had the tradition of high sizes of underground economy and, hence, tax
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evasion (See Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).). Besides, their reliance on seigniorage, through
high inflation rates and reserve requirements, is also well documented in the literature (See Gupta
2005.).
As suggested at the onset, the paper incorporates endogenous tax evasion in a standard general
equilibrium model of overlapping generations. There are two primary assets in the model storage
(capital) and fiat money. Storage dominates money in rate of return. An intermediary exists to
provide a rudimentary pooling function, accepting deposits to finance the investment needs of the
firms, but are subjected to mandatory cash-reserve requirements. There is also an infinitely lived
government with two wings: a treasury which finances expenditure by taxing income and setting
penalty for tax evasion when caught; and the central bank, which controls the growth rate of the
nominal stock of money and the reserve requirements. In such an environment we deduce the
optimal degree of tax evasion, derived from the consumer optimization problem, as function of the
parameters and policy variables of the model. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out
the economic environment; Section 3, 4 and 5 respectively, are devoted in defining the monetary
competitive equilibrium, discussing the process of calibration, and analyzing the behavior of the
optimal degree of tax evasion corresponding to movements in the policy parameters. Section 6
concludes and lays out the areas of further research.
2 Economic Environment
Time is divided into discrete segments, and is indexed by t = 1, 2,...... There are four theaters of eco-
nomic activities: (i) each two-period lived overlapping generations household (consumer/worker)
is endowed with one unit of labor when young, but the agent retires when old. The labor en-
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dowment is supplied inelastically to earn wage income, a part of the tax-liability is evaded, with
evasion being determined endogenously to maximize utility, and the rest is deposited into banks for
future consumption; (ii) each infinitely lived producer is endowed with a production technology
to manufacture the single final good, using the inelastically supplied labor, physical capital and
credit facilitated by the financial intermediaries; (iii) the banks simply converts one period deposit
contracts into loans, after meeting the cash reserve requirements. No resources are assumed to be
spent in running the banks, and; (iv) there is an infinitely lived government which meets its expen-
diture by taxing income, setting penalty for tax evasion when caught, and controlling the inflation
tax instruments – the money growth rate and the reserve requirements. There is a continuum of
each type of economic agents with unit mass.
The sequence of events can be outlined as follows: When young a household works receives
pre-paid wages, evades a part of the tax burden and deposits the rest into banks. A bank, after
meeting the reserve requirement, provides a loan to a goods producer, which subsequently manu-
factures the final good and returns the loan with interests. Finally, the banks pay back the deposits
with interests to households at the end of the first period and the latter consumes in the second
period.
2.1 Consumers
Given that the consumers possess an unit of time endowment which is supplied inelastically, and
consumes only when old, formally the problem of the consumer can be described as follows: The
utility of a consumer born at t depends on real consumption, ct+1, implying that the consumer
consumes only when old. The assumptions make computations tractable and is not a bad approxi-
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mation of the real world (See Hall (1988).). All consumers have the same preferences so that there
exists a representative consumer in each generation. The utility function of a consumer born at
time t can be written as follows:
Ut = u(ct+1) (1)
where U is twice differentiable; moreover u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 and u′(0) = ∞. The above utility
function is maximized subject to the following constraints:
Dt ≤ q[(1− βτt)ptwt − η(1− β)2ptwt] (2)
+ (1− q)[(1− βτt)ptwt − θtτt(1− β)ptwt − η(1− β)2ptwt]
pt+1ct+1 ≤ (1 + iDt+1)Dt (3)
where equation (2) is the feasibility (first-period) budget constraint and equation (3) denotes the
second period budget constraint for the consumer. Note equation (2) implicitly assumes the exis-
tence of some sort of an insurance mechanism that always ensures the consumer a certain amount
of deposits dt, in our case. Alternatively, we could have assumed the consumer to be risk-neutral.
In that case, equation (2) would be the expected value of the deposits obtained. So in some sense we
have an observationally equivalent formulation. Our results are, however, independent of whether
the consumer is risk-averse or risk neutral, once we assume the existence of an implicit insurance
scheme. pt (pt+1) denotes the money price of the final good at t (t+1); Dt is the per-capita nominal
deposits; 1− q is the probability of getting caught when evading tax; β is the fraction of tax paid;
τt is the income tax rate at t; θt is the penalty imposed, when audited and caught, at t; wt is the
real wage at t, η > 0, is a cost parameter, and; iDt+1 is the nominal interest rate received on the
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deposits at t+ 1.
The constraints can be explained as follows: For the potential evader, there are (ex-ante) two
possible situations: “success” (i.e., getting away with evasion) and “failure” (i.e., getting discov-
ered and being convicted). If the consumer is found guilty of concealing an amount of income
(1− β)ptwt, then he has to pay the amount of the evaded tax liability, (1− β)τtptwt and a propor-
tional fine at a rate of θt > 1. Notice we have assumed that the household has to incur transaction
costs to evade taxes. These basically involve costs of hiring lawyers to avoid/reduce tax burdens,
and bribes paid to tax officials and administrators. The transaction costs are incurred in evading
taxes are assumed to be increasing in both degree of tax evasion and the wage income of the house-
hold. The form η (1−β)2 ptwt is consistent with our assumptions about the behavior of transaction
costs. Note a higher value of η, would imply a less corrupted economy, implying that it is more
difficult to evade taxes. We also endogenize the probability of getting caught, q, by assuming it to
be an increasing function of the degree of tax evasion. q takes the following quadratic form:
1− q = (1− β)2 (4)
The second-period budget constraint is self-explanatory suggesting that the consumer when old
consumes out of the interest income from deposits – the only source of income, given that he is
retired. The household chooses β to maximize his utility from second-period consumption subject
to the intertemporal budget constraint given as follows:
ct+1 ≤ (1 + rdt+1)[(1− βτt)− θtτt(1− β)3 − η(1− β)2]wt (5)
where rdt+1 is the real interest rate on deposits at period t + 1. Note (1 + rdt+1) =
1+iDt+1
1+pit+1
, where
1 + pit+1 =
pt+1
pt
.
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Realizing that both the real interest rate on deposits and the wages would depend on the degree
of tax evasion, the first order condition for the consumer is given as follows:
dU
dβ
= 0 = u′(ct+1)
[
{ d
dβ
(1 + rdt+1)}dt + (1 + rdt+1)ddt
dβ
]
(6)
The optimal value of β at steady-state is determined below after the equilibrium conditions are
imposed and the steady state value of the capital stock is determined.
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
At the start of each period the financial intermediaries accept deposits and make their portfolio
decision (that is, loans and cash reserves choices) with a goal of maximizing profits. At the end of
the period they receive their interest income from the loans made and meets the interest obligations
on the deposits. Note the intermediaries are constrained by legal requirements on the choice of
their portfolio (that is, reserve requirements), as well as by feasibility. Given such a structure, the
intermediaries obtains the optimal choice for Lt by solving the following problem:
max
L,D
pib = iLtLt − iDtDt (7)
s.t. : γtDt + Lt 6 Dt (8)
where pib is the profit function for the financial intermediary, and Mt > γtDt defines the legal
reserve requirement. Mt is the cash reserves held by the bank; Lt is the loans; iLt is the interest
rate on loans, and; γt is the reserve requirement ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the ratio of
required reserves (which must be held in form of currency) to deposits.
To gain some economic intuition of the role of reserve requirements, let us consider the solution
7
of the problem for a typical intermediary. Free entry, drives profits to zero and we have
iLt(1− γt)− iDt = 0 (9)
Simplifying, in equilibrium, the following condition must hold
iLt =
iDt
1− γt (10)
Reserve requirements thus tend to induce a wedge between the interest rate on savings and
lending rates for the financial intermediary.
2.3 Firms
Each firm produces a single final good using a standard neoclassical production function F (kt, nt),
with kt and nt, respectively denoting the capital and labor input at time t. The production technol-
ogy is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form:
Y = F (k, n) = kαn(1−α) (11)
where 0 < α ((1 − α)) < 1, is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (labor). At date
t the final good can either be consumed or stored. Next we assume that producers are capable
of converting bank loans Lt into fixed capital formation such that ptikt = Lt, where it denotes
the investment in physical capital. Notice that the production transformation schedule is linear
so that the same technology applies to both capital formation and the production of consumption
good and hence both investment and consumption good sell for the same price p. Moreover, we
follow Diamond and Yellin (1990) and Chen, Chiang and Wang (2000) in assuming that the goods
producer is a residual claimer, i.e., the producer uses up the unsold consumption good in a way
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which is consistent with lifetime value maximization of the firms. such an assumption regarding
ownership avoids the “unnecessary” Arrow-Debreu redistribution from firms to consumers and
simultaneously retains the general equilibrium structure.
The representative firm at any point of time t maximizes the discounted stream of profit flows
subject to the capital evolution and loan constraint. Formally, the problem of the firm can be
outlined as follows
max
kt+1,nt
∞∑
i=0
ρi[ptk
α
t n
(1−α)
t − ptwtnt − (1 + iLt)Lt] (12)
kt+1 6 (1− δk)kt + ikt (13)
ptikt = Lt (14)
where ρ is the firm owners (constant) discount factor, and δk is the (constant) rate of capital depre-
ciation. The firm solves the above problem to determine the demand for labor and investment.
The firm’s problem can be written in the following recursive formulation:
V (kt) = max
n,k′
[ptk
α
t n
(1−α)
t − ptwtnt − pt(1 + iLt)(kt+1 − (1− δk)kt)] + ρV (kt+1) (15)
The upshot of the above dynamic programming problem are the following first order conditions.
kt+1 : (1 + iLt)pt = ρV
′(kt+1) (16)
(nt) : (1− α)
(
kt
nt
)α
= wt (17)
And the following envelope condition.
V ′(kt) = pt[α
(
nt
kt
)(1−α)
+ (1 + iLt)(1− δk)] (18)
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Optimization, leads to the following efficiency condition, besides (17), for the production firm.
(1 + iLt) = ρ(1 + pit+1)[α
(
nt+1
kt+1
)(1−α)
+ (1 + iLt+1)(1− δk)] (19)
Equation (19) provides the condition for the optimal investment decision of the firm. The firm
compares the cost of increasing investment in the current period with the future stream of benefit
generated from the extra capital invested in the current period. And equation (17) simply states
that the firm hires labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor equates the real wage.
2.4 Government
As discussed above we have an infinitely lived government with two wings: the treasury and
the central bank. The government finances its expenditure ptgt through taxation, penalty on con-
sumers when caught evading and the inflation tax (seigniorage). Formally the government budget
constraint can be written as follows:
ptgt = βτtptwt + (1− q)θt(1− β)τtptwt + (Mt −Mt−1) (20)
Note throughout the analysis we will assume that money growth is dictated by a rule, Mt =
(1 + µt)Mt−1, where µ is the rate of growth of money. Using, Mt = γtDt, the government
budget constraint in real terms can be rewritten as
gt = [β + (1− q)θt(1− β)]τtwt + γtdt(1− 1
1 + µt
) (21)
where dt = (Dtpt ) is the size of deposits in real terms. Skinner and Slemrod (1985) points out that
the administrative costs of penalties is usually quite minor, and, hence, for simplicity we ignore
them from the government budget constraint.
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3 Equilibrium
A valid perfect-foresight, competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices {pt, iDt, iLt}∞t=0,
allocations {ct, nt, ikt}∞t=0, stocks of financial assets {mt, dt}∞t=0, and policy variables {γt, µt, τt, θt, gt}∞t=0
such that:
• Taking, τt, gt, θt, γt, µt, pt, the consumer optimally chooses β such that (6) holds;
• Banks maximize profits, taking, iLt, iDt, and γt as given and such that (9) holds;
• The real allocations solve the firm’s date–t profit maximization problem, (12), given prices
and policy variables.
• The money market equilibrium conditions: mt = γtdt is satisfied for all t > 0.
• The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: ptikt = (1− γt)Dt where the total supply
of loans Lt = (1− γt)Dt is satisfied for all t > 0.
• The goods market equilibrium condition require: ct + ikt + gt = kαt n(1−α)t is satisfied for all
t > 0.
• The labor market equilibrium condition: (nt)d =1 for all t > 0.
• The government budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis.
• dt, (1 + rdt) and pt must be positive at all dates and 1 + iLt > 1.
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4 Optimal Degree of Tax Evasion
Using the equilibrium conditions, realizing that there is no growth in the model and allowing the
government to follow time invariant policy rules, which means the reserve–ratio, γt, the money
supply growth–rate, µt, the tax–rate, τt, and the penalty, θt, are constant over time, we have the
following set of equations:
1 + rd = (1 + rl)(1− γ) + γ
1 + pi
(22)
w = (1− α)kα (23)
(1 + rl) =
ραk(α−1)
1− ρ(1 + pi)(1− δk) (24)
(1− γ)[(1− βτ)− θτ(1− β)3 − η(1− β)2]w = δkk (25)
where rl is the real interest rate on loans. Using (22) to (25) we can solve k in terms of the policy
variables, production parameters of the model and β and is given by the following equation:
k =
(
(1− γ)(1− α)[(1− βτ)− θτ(1− β)3 − η(1− β)2]
δ
) 1
1−α
(26)
Realizing that µ= pi, from the money market equilibrium condition, the gross real interest rate
on deposits (1 + rd), and real wage w are given by the following expressions:
(1 + rd) =
[
ραδk
(1− α)(1− ρ(1 + µ)(1− δk))
] [
1
[(1− βτ)− θτ(1− β)3 − η(1− β)2]
]
(27)
+
γ
1 + µ
w = (1− α)
{
(1− α)(1− γ) [(1− βτ)− θτ(1− β)
3 − η(1− β)2]
δk
} α
(1−α)
(28)
where 1 + rl =
(
ραδk
(1−γ)(1−α)(1−ρ(1+µ)(1−δk))
)(
1
[(1−βτ)−θτ(1−β)3−η(1−β)2]
)
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Using (2) evaluated at steady-state, (27) and (28) we can rewrite equation (6) as follows:
d
dβ

{
ραδk
(1−α)(1−ρ(1+µ)(1−δk)) +
γ
1+µ
[(1− βτ)− θτ(1− β)3 − η(1− β)2]
}
(1− α)
{
(1− α)(1− γ) [(1−βτ)−θτ(1−β)3−η(1−β)2]
δk
} α
(1−α)
 = 0 (29)
given that u′(ct+1) > 0. Once we derive the optimal value of β by solving (29) in terms of the
parameters and policy variables we can obtain the reduced form solution to the other endogenous
variables in the model.
The derivative of (29) yields a non-linear equation for β and needs to be analyzed in essen-
tially an non-algebraic fashion, and hence, the choice of parameter values become essential. The
following section discuses the process of calibration.
5 Calibration
In this section we attribute values to the parameters of our benchmark model using a combination
of figures from previous studies and facts about the economic experience for our sample economies
between 1980 and 1998.
We follow the standard real business cycle literature in using steady–state conditions to estab-
lish parameter values observed in the data. Some parameters are calibrated using country–specific
data, while others, without sufficient country–specific evidence over a long period, correspond to
prevailing values from the literature. This section reveals the general procedures used. The cali-
brated parameters are reported in Table 1. Note unless otherwise stated, the source for all data is
the IMF – International Financial Statistics (IFS).
A first set of parameter values is given by numbers usually found in the literature. These are:
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• (1 − α): since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this corresponds to the share of
labor in income. (1 − α) for Spain, Italy and Greece is derived from Zimmermann (1997)
and the value for Portugal is obtained from Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). The values
lie between 53.0 percent (Portugal) and 62.7 percent (Spain);
• δk: the depreciation rate of physical capital for Spain, Italy and Greece is derived from
Zimmermann (1997) and the value for Portugal is obtained from Correia, Neves and Rebelo
(1995). The values lie between 3.2 percent (Greece) and 5.2 percent (Italy);
• UGE: The parameter measures the size of the underground economy as a percentage of
GDP. The values are obtained from Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) and lies between 23.1
percent (Spain and Portugal) to 29.0 percent (Greece).
• θ: the penalty imposed by the government when the consumer is caught evading is obtained
from Chen (2003) and is set to 1.5 for all countries.
• η: the transaction cost parameter is obtained from Chen (2003) and is set to 0.15.
A second set of parameters is determined individually for each country. Here, we use averages
over the whole sample period to find values that do not depend on the current business cycle. These
parameters are:
• pi: the annual rate of inflation lies between 7.52 percent (Spain) and 15.16 percent (Greece);
• γ: the annual reserve–deposit ratio lies between 13.7 percent (Italy) and 23.5 percent (Greece);
• τ : the tax rate, calculated as the ratio of tax–receipts to GDP, lies between 22.74 percent
(Greece) and 36.25 percent (Italy);
14
• iLt: the nominal interest rate on loans lies between 12.89 percent (Spain) and 22.96 percent
(Greece);
The following set of parameters are calibrated from the steady state equations of the model:
• µ: the money growth rate is set equal to the rate of inflation, given the money market equi-
librium condition. The annual rate of money growth rate hence, lies between 7.52 percent
(Spain) and 15.16 percent (Greece);
• ρ: the discount factor of the firms is solved to ensure that equation (24) holds. The value
ranges between 0.87 (Greece) to 0.94 (Spain).
• β: the fraction of reported income is determined by the following method:
TE
Y
= UGE × τ (30)
where TE
Y
is tax evasion as a percentage of GDP.
We have assumed that the effective average tax rate is the same in the official and the under-
ground economy. Given that
(1− β) =
TE
Y
[TE
Y
+ τ ]
(31)
We consider this exogenously evaluated value of the reported income parameter as the
steady-state value. Note the value hinges critically on the size of the underground econ-
omy as a percentage of the GDP. The value of β lies between 0.775 (Greece) and 0.810
(Spain and Portugal), implying that 22.5 percent of the taxes are evaded in Greece and the
figure in Spain and Portugal corresponds to a tx evasion of 19.0 percent.
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[INSERT TABLE 1]
6 Effects of policy decision on Tax Evasion
As suggested earlier, given that the non-linearity of the model does not allow us to solve it in an
algebraic fashion, we map the function for β, obtained from equation (29), given the parameters of
the model. Note the point where the function crosses the X-axis, is where we obtain our country-
specific steady state value of the reported income. The movements in this function is studied
corresponding to changes in values of the policy parameters. The response of the reported income
to changes in τ , θ, γ and µ are discussed below. Figures 1 through 20 reports the effects of policies
in the (β, F ) plane. F on the Y-axis corresponds to the value of the function, given by equation
(29).
First, we analyze the effect of a change in the reserve requirements. An increase (decrease)
in reserve requirements by 10 percent increases (decreases), the steady-state value of the reported
income. As can be observed from Figures 1 through 4, a hike in the reserve requirements, moves
the economy from the initial equilibrium at E to E1, while a reduction in the reserve ratio, results
inE2, as the new equilibrium. So reserve ratio and reported income are positively related, however,
as can be observed from the scales, the strength of the effect is negligible.
Figures 5 through 8 study the effect of a 1 percent change in the money growth rate. Just like in
the case of the reserve requirements, increase (decrease) of money growth rate reduces (increases)
the degree of evasion, but only marginally. Starting from E, an increases in the inflation rate,
takes the economy to E1 (E2). However, as figures 9 to 12 shows, marked increases in money
growth rates can drastically, reduce the level of reported income. Note multiple equilibria arise.
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An increases in the money growth rate by the amount of 10 percent for Greece, 20 percent for Spain
and 30 percent for Italy and Portugal, causes the L curve to move to L1, such that we have two
equilibria atE1 andE2. While atE1, the reported income increases marginally in comparison toE,
the tax evasion jumps enormously at E2. So the model predicts that high reliance on seigniorage,
mainly based on higher money growth rates, can result in very high degrees of tax evasion.
Figures 13 through 16 analyze a 1 percent change in tax rates. An increase (decrease) in tax
rate moves the economy from E to E1 (E2), resulting in an increase (decrease) in the degree of
tax evasion. So higher tax rates result in higher evasion. Finally, we analyze the changes in the
penalty rate. The penalty rate is increases to 1.55 from 1.50 and then reduced to 1.45. As figures 17
through 20 shows, the increase in the penalty rate moves the economy to E1, reducing the degree
of tax evasion, while a reduction in the penalty rate, causes the agents in the economy to report less
of their income, and move the economy to E2. Note, a look at the scale on the X-axis, reveals that
the effects of changes in tax and penalty rates are relatively stronger when compared to changes in
the reserve requirement and mild inflation or deflation, starting from the initial equilibrium at E.
7 Conclusion and Areas of Further Research
This paper analyzes the relationship between the “optimal” degree of tax evasion and policy deci-
sions, for four European economies, using a simple overlapping generations framework. More pre-
cisely, the analysis tries to provide a microeconomic foundation to the process of tax evasion given
the policy decisions of the social planner. The motivation for such an analysis simply emerges
from the lack of any study, that endogenizes the process of tax evasion to understand better the
effects of alternative policies on the same.
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When numerically analyzed for four southern European countries, the following conclusions
could be made: (i) Reserve ratio and reported income have a very weak positive relationship; (ii)
Mild changes in money growth rate moves the reported income in the same direction, and as in the
case of reserve ratio, the strength of the effect is very weak. However, high increases in money
growth rate can result in multiple equilibria, with the possibility of reported income increasing
marginally and simultaneously falling by a very large extent; (iii) Increases (decreases) in the
penalty rates of evading taxes would induce consumers to report greater (smaller) fraction of their
income, while increases (decreases) in the income-tax rates would cause them to evade greater
(lesser) fraction of their income.
So in summary, from a policy perspective, the model suggests that, the best way to reduce
tax evasion is by increasing the penalty rates, in cases taxes cannot be reduced due to budgetary
pressures. Changes in inflation and reserve requirements can only have mild effect on the degree of
evasion, unless the money growth rates are increased significantly, in which case reported income
can fall drastically. An immediate extension of the current model would be to study the effects of
tax evasion on growth in an endogenous growth model, and in turn, also analyze the role of policies
in fostering growth and reducing tax evasion.
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Table 1: Calibration of Parameters
(1− α) δk UGE pi = µ γ τ iL ρ β
Spain 0.627 0.05 23.1 7.52 14.1 25.53 12.89 0.94 0.810
Italy 0.617 0.052 27.3 8.58 13.7 36.25 15.02 0.93 0.786
Greece 0.598 0.032 29.0 15.16 23.5 22.74 22.96 0.87 0.775
Portugal 0.530 0.05 23.1 13.04 19.8 27.73 19.09 0.88 0.810
Note: Parameters defined as above.
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Figure 1: Effect of Reserve Ratio (Spain)
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Figure 2: Effect of Reserve Ratio (Italy)
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Figure 3: Effect of Reserve Ratio (Greece)
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Figure 4: Effect of Reserve Ratio (Portugal)
0.6204 0.6206 0.6208 0.6212 0.6214 Beta
0.046
0.048
0.052
0.054
F
L1
E E1
L
L2
E2
Figure 5: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Spain)
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Figure 6: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Italy)
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Figure 7: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Greece)
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Figure 8: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Portugal)
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Figure 9: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Spain)
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Figure 10: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Italy)
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Figure 11: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Greece)
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Figure 12: Effect of Money Growth Rate (Portugal)
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Figure 13: Effect of Tax Rate (Spain)
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Figure 14: Effect of Tax Rate (Italy)
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Figure 15: Effect of Tax Rate (Greece)
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Figure 16: Effect of Tax Rate (Portugal)
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Figure 17: Effect of Penalty Rate (Spain)
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Figure 18: Effect of Penalty Rate (Italy)
0.605 0.615 0.62 0.625Beta
-0.04
-0.02
0.02
F
L1
E E1
L
L2
E2
24
Figure 19: Effect of Penalty Rate (Greece)
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Figure 20: Effect of Penalty Rate (Portugal)
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